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Aristotle's Poetics and Aristotle's Nature 
Natalie Crohn Schmitt* 
I was taught that the Poetics results from Aristotle's empiricism, that as 
Francis Fergusson puts it, Aristotle "s tar ts with works of art he knew well, 
and tries to see in them what the poet was aiming at, and how he puts his play 
or poem together ." 1 T h e more contemporary view is that Aristotle's gen-
eralizations about d rama are derived from the nature of the subject, not from 
a study of particular works . 2 What follows is based on the conviction that the 
Poetics can also be understood as following logically from Aristotle's work in 
natural science. 3 
Only a small portion of Aristotle's work is concerned with what he called 
productive science, the art of making things like houses and plays. Aristotle 
was also interested in practical science, which is concerned with how people 
are to act in various circumstances, and with theoretical science, which 
includes mathematics, theology and natural science. Indeed, the greatest part 
of Aristotle's life was devoted to the study of natural science including areas 
we would now call meterology, chemistry, physics, psychology, and biology. 
Fully a third of Aristotle's work was in biology. 
John Herman Randall argues that all of Aristotle's thought is primarily 
functional and biological; that Aristotle aimed above all at understanding life, 
particularly human life: " H i s whole philosophy is built around the categories 
of l i fe ." 4 In keeping with this idea, I argue that the Poetics, now regarded as a 
relatively late work, can be usefully interpreted in light of Aristotle's 
understanding of natural science, particularly biology. Because art, according 
to Aristotle, is to imitate nature 's way of acting, the conviction that we can 
analyze much of the Poetics in terms of what he took to be nature 's prcKiesses 
should not be very surprising. But to my knowledge, the relationship between 
Aristotle's science and his Poetics has not been made explicit. 
So profound has been the influence of Aristotle's dramatic theory over the 
last four hundred years that contemporary theatre which violates its principles 
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is referred to as "ant i - thea t re ," and is thought to be anti-reality. Critic 
Ronald Hayman, for instance, presumes that contemporary theatre, ' 'anti-
theatre ," is "hostile to reality, though the anti-world it creates can never 
provide a viable alternative to real i ty." 5 Such presumption shares Aristotle's 
common sense idea that reality is a given, our means of knowing what it is and 
of representing it not problematic. But, I argue elsewhere, 6 contemporary 
theatre like contemporary science, challenges that idea. And it calls upon us to 
make explicit the view of nature implicit everywhere in Aristotle's aesthetic. 
Aristotle's underlying assumption about art is that it is continuous with 
nature and that all principles of explanation must find illustration in the works 
of both nature and art. Aristotle understood " a r t " to mean the making of 
something, the realizing of some form in some matter. Nature is the great 
maker or artist. H u m a n artists, like nature, also make something, realize 
some form in some matter. The only difference between nature and the 
human artists is that nature makes something out of its own materials, 
whereas human artists make something out of some materials outside 
themselves. 7 H u m a n production, art, is for Aristotle the clearest illustration of 
what a natural process is, of what nature can do. It is the most complex, and 
in a sense the most successful instance of nature at work, carrying nature 's 
enterprises to their most successful fulfillment. Hence many comments about 
the making of art are to be found in the Physics, which is Aristotle's 
philosophical introduction to the concepts of natural science and as much an 
analysis of the "process by a r t " as of any other natural process, and in the 
Metaphysics, Book Theta, which is an analysis of what is involved in any 
process or kinesis. 
John Herman Randall sees Aristotle's endeavors to be centered on 
knowing three things: living, knowing, and talking—knowing and talking 
being the distinctive attributes of human life. 8 I here borrow Randall 's 
categories showing that the thought in the Poetics can be understood to follow 
from Aristotle's ideas about living, knowing, and talking. 
I. L I V I N G 
A. A C T I O N 
Aristotle believed the subject matter of natural science to be motion. By 
motion he meant any transition from potential to actual being: a change from 
one state of affairs to another. For Aristotle, nature is a principle of 
movement. 9 The wide scope of the Aristotelian concept of motion is perpetu-
ated in the later scholastic adage: "who knows not motion knows not na ture . ' ' 
But since Aristotle wants most of all to understand life, his account of change 
must explain what he considers to be the characteristic change of earthly living 
things, namely, developmental change. He wants to understand the " m o -
tion" of eggs, not just of billiard balls. 
The most complex and developed forms of change and motion are living 
and knowing. It is these above all other motions that science must explain. 
Not accidentally, it is also these which drama imitates. All art, according to 
Aristotle, imitates human life—not its outward acts, but these as they 
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represent spiritual movements, the activity of the soul. Landscape and 
animals, then, are not thought of as objects of aesthetic imitat ion. 1 0 If, 
furthermore, "poetry imitates men who live at the level of action, for whom 
action is the goal and the principle of life: 'men in action, ' but also 'men of 
action,' " n then evidently, drama is the most satisfying of the arts. And plot, 
which is character in action, is more important than character. Action, 
however, should not be understood in any shallow sense: what human beings 
delight in is imitation of human powers of operation. Of these, knowing is one 
of the most important, for it is the nature of a human being to seek knowledge; 
and recognition, which is the representation of the character's coming to 
know, plays an important part in the best dramas and is closely allied with the 
reversal. The best d rama necessarily entails growth and development of 
character. 
Aristotle's concept of action in drama has its primary characteristics in 
common with the primary characteristics of his concept of motion in nature. 
Each is central to the analysis of the matter at hand. Each, as I show, is 
understood as an innate principle, a way of acting, a finite process defined by 
its end, determinate, continuous in time, and unified. 
Given Aristotle's idea of nature as change or process and his idea that 
drama is an imitation of nature, that is of an action, a complex human 
motion, we should not be surprised that among the arts his first interest is in 
the drama, nor that in the d rama the first principle is plot. According to him, 
all the poetic arts imitate action but drama evidently reproduces it most 
completely. 
1. C A U S A L I T Y 
Nature is an innate impulse toward movement . 1 2 The distinction Aristotle 
draws between natural and manufactured objects lies precisely in that: 
elements and their compounds, and animals initiate movement from within. 1 3 
Aristotle is interested in human beings, not as they are buffeted about by 
forces external to them but as their actions arise from within them. The 
concept of human powers of operation means that the source or origin of the 
movement is innate to the characters represented. This internal principle of 
movement he calls the sou l . 1 4 Motion is the actualization of what is potential: 
the oak tree is the acorn 's power realized. " T h e germ is the ruling influence 
and fabricator of the offspr ing." 1 5 There is thus continuity in the human 
personality; it has a single identity throughout its existence. A person will 
change and develop but that development can be understood as that which 
would arise necessarily or probably. Behavior can be analyzed causally. In the 
drama the agents' dispositions are revealed by their choices and refusals. The 
analysis of nature in terms of cause explains why Aristotle asserts that "the 
character will be good if the purpose is g o o d . " 1 6 Plot is the principle of motion 
in the play, its soul, as it were. To understand the action, the analysis of plot, 
like that of each character, must be causal. 
2. T E L E O L O G Y 
The nature of a thing is its power of acting in a specific determinate way. 
Motion is the realization of the form or the purpose of potential being. The 
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nature of a thing is identical with the end toward which it is moving. Life is to 
be understood not in terms of its elements and origins alone but in terms of its 
ends. Aristotle's concept of nature is teleological. What each thing is when 
fully developed is its nature. "Life consists in action and its end is a mode of 
action, not a quality . . . and the end is the chief thing of a l l . " 1 7 We can 
readily understand Aristotle's preference for the dramatic action which is 
done rather than contemplated and not done. 
To the whole of nature there is an unconscious purpose: the highest good is 
immanent in the world as its intelligible order and transcends the world as its 
ideal end. The logical moves the world. The things which come to be by 
natural processes all exhibit in their coming to be a uniformity either absolute 
or highly regular. Nature always does the best among possible courses. As 
nature is orderly so should drama be. Within that which is shown there should 
be nothing illogical. Everything should follow necessarily or probably; art 
should be controlled as if by a ruling force of nature. 
The purposes of nature are not only logical but ethical. While each thing 
can be good according to its kind, that drama is best which imitates noble 
actions, and the highest in nature, because these are finally the truest 
representations of nature 's efforts. Tragedy represents persons of superior 
moral bent and so is the highest kind of d r a m a . 1 8 As nature satisfies the moral 
sense, so should tragedy. It is unnatural for an utterly good person to fall into 
unhappiness. Character is that which reveals moral purpose, showing the 
kinds of things a person chooses or avoids . 1 9 It and thought are needed to give 
the agent's actions moral quality, and moral quality is needed in order to 
account plausibly for the agent's success or failure, i.e. his end in happiness or 
unhappiness. 
I turn from the purpose of nature in general to the purpose of art in 
general and of tragedy in particular. Art is an activity in which something is 
made distinct from the activity of producing it. The artwork, the object 
produced by the activity of " m a k i n g , " is itself a means to the using of it and 
finally to some form of action which is its own end. Useful and fine arts are— 
both alike—art. In the case of fine arts, it does not seem that Aristotle thought 
of aesthetic contemplation as an end in itself. 2 0 All activities differ in goodness 
or desirability, and their proper pleasures differ accordingly. There is a great 
difference between the pleasures derived from the various arts, and their ends 
are to be kept distinct. Alien pleasures interfere with the artwork. Aristotle 
would not have been impressed with the tragical-comical-historical-pastoral or 
poem unlimited which the players in Hamlet are said to have been capable of 
playing. Each art product, like each kind of activity, is to be distinguished by 
its end. 
The end of tragedy is to effect the arousal and then the catharsis of pity and 
fear. The word catharsis has been variously understood to mean "purga t ion , " 
"purification," or "clarification." It is explained in the Rhetoric that fear is 
caused by whatever we see that has great power of destroying us, of harming 
us in ways that tend to cause us great pain, and that, generally speaking, 
anything causes us to feel fear that—when it happens to or threatens others— 
causes us to feel pi ty. 2 1 By "purga t ion" is meant the elimination of the 
feelings of pity and fear, by "purification," the amelioration of such feelings, 
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and by "clarification," the manifestation of a coherent relation between the 
hero's character and his end. Aristotle required that tragedy show (or seem to 
show) a relationship between a tragic character and his tragic fate. A fatal 
tragedy with a wholly good person as a protagonist is, in his view, repellant; a 
fatal tragedy about a good person with a harmartia [translated by Hardison as 
"miscalculation" or "miss ing the m a r k " ] is not only satisfactory but 
produces the highest kind of tragic p leasure . 2 2 We come, through such work, 
to understand that there is a kind of logic and morality to the universe after 
all. "Clarification" is the meaning of catharsis most closely allied with the idea 
of the importance of hamartia and is also most consistent with Aristotle's belief 
that people take pleasure in imitation because they take pleasure in learning. 
However, it is not necessary to support one of the three definitions over any 
other to understand in general the significance of Aristotle's idea about the 
purpose of tragedy, for each of the definitions entails the assumption that there 
is in some sense a causal relationship between a person's behavior and the 
events which befall him. Each also entails the assumption that society or, at 
least, Athenian society, is part of nature and is therefore good, and that 
whatever in the society makes us feel pity and fear is something that we have 
to come to terms with individually. All of nature is a cause that operates for a 
purpose and that purpose is finally ethical. Of course, practically every 
modern drama is at odds with these assumptions. The good woman of Setzuan 
suffers through no fault of her own. The society in which she lives is not good, 
not natural, and as an individual she cannot survive in it. Nothing will do, 
Brecht implies, but that collective action be taken to overthrow the existing 
society. 
The persistent suggestion that Aristotle was unsure about whether tragedy 
had reached its final form of development (chapter 4) is, according to Gerald 
Else, a foolish one: 
Aristotle makes it perfectly clear . . . that he regards tragedy as having 
reached the heights with Sophocles and Euripides. . . . So far as his 
"his tory" of the poetic art is concerned, Aristotle justifies his implica-
tion that tragedy was at its highest form and had reached a kind of 
perfection by pointing out that serious poetry did end its development 
with that form. . . . One can speak of tragedy as having come or 
sprung from a much earlier primitive stage, just as one can speak of a 
man's birth and early years, even though during them, strictly 
speaking, he was a baby and not a m a n . 2 3 
There is a natural progression to higher forms but the development of art is 
not an endlessly evolving process. 
Art does not infinitely evolve because, according to Aristotle, nature does 
not. The idea of motion entails the idea of development and change, but the 
motions are finite. T h e world is not a process of processes; Aristotle is not an 
evolutionist. He regards matter as ungenerated, indestructible and eternal, 
and the world as stable and unchanging. Nothing new or different ever 
actually happens. Art cannot consist of perpetually new creation because that 
which represents reality is timeless. For Aristotle creation means discovery, 
the uncovering of a true relation which already exists in the scheme of things. 
The happy life is not one of search for truth but of contemplation of truth 
already attained. 
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The highest art is not only eternal but universal. The idea that art can be 
universal arises from Aristotle's concept of space. He believes it to be finite 
and far more limited than we know it to be today. He views the heavens as a 
series of concentric spheres to which the various heavenly bodies—sun, moon, 
planets, stars—are attached. The heavens are unchanging. The motion of 
each concentric sphere is circular and regular. Perhaps one might best think of 
place rather than space, for each thing has a proper place and a fixed 
relationship to the whole. At the center of these spheres is the earth, situated 
motionless. Man at the stationary center of the universe has the ideal 
perspective on things. 
While motion in the heavens is absolutely regular, Aristotle acknowledges 
that on earth things are more complex: there is precariousness and contin-
gency as well as stability, order, and regularity. That is why he says that, 
outside mathematics, things happen in certain ways, "always or for the most 
p a r t . " 2 4 Chance represents a limit set to science: it stands for all those events 
for which no scientific prediction is possible. It is what the scientist sets to one 
side when he says, "O the r things being equal, such and such will take place." 
One cannot have a science of all the things that may befall any particular 
acorn, only of these that are " n a t u r a l " to acorns in general, of the powers any 
acorn possesses "by n a t u r e . " The rest are contingent, accidental, incidental 
to being an acorn. All the ends caused by factors that are not relevant to the 
ends of natural processes, all the nonteleological events interfering with the 
natural working out of a process, are chance events. An acorn's becoming a 
squirrel's breakfast, for instance, is a chance event; it impinges on the natural 
process of the acorn "by violence" from without. "Chance is any event 
having no end, no For What , 'itself in vain' . . . . Chance hence presupposes 
an order of natural teleology and is posterior to that order. It is said to be 
'against nature ' or 'contrary to nature, ' like the birth of distorted mon-
s t e r s . " 2 5 
As chance events are not part of the natural working out of occurrences, 
they have no business in works of art. Art, like science, shows what is essential 
to a kind of thing or event. Art and science begin with things we perceive by 
the senses, yet they do not merely express these but embody the universal 
truths about these things. Knowledge is not of the particulars but is identical 
with the universal forms, the intelligible structure of the world. What the poet 
represents, then, is not the actuality of events but their logical structure, their 
meaning. Art imitates nature by doing what nature is prevented from doing 
fully and completely by unnatural events: " T o seize the universal, and to 
reproduce it in its simple and sensuous form is not to reflect a reality already 
familiar through sense perceptions; rather it is a rivalry of nature, a 
completion of her unfulfilled purposes, a correction of her fa i lures ." 2 6 
3 . U N I T Y AND O R D E R 
Motions in nature are clearly distinguished from one another. The study 
of science and the subject matter for dramatic analysis is a single action 
removed from all other actions. Hence, Aristotle does not think highly of plays 
with multiple plots. Analysis had best be of a change of a single thing that 
i 
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remains identical in kind through a continuous interval of time. We know that 
we are dealing with a single motion or process when it has been completed, for 
anything that can be said to be a unity is always complete and whole. It is this 
feature of reaching a goal or end that makes a process self-limiting. The action 
in drama consists of a development and eventual change of state in time which 
is carried through to a natural goal in happiness or unhappiness. Reversal and 
discovery may be understood as changes from a particular state to its opposite. 
Reversal is an action's turn ing back upon itself and is, Aristotle thinks, highly 
desirable in drama. Circular motion—the motion of the spheres—is first, for 
that which is complete is prior in nature to that which is incomplete, like 
motion in a straight line which has no limit or end. 
As action takes place in continuous time, drama is essentially a time art. 
The means of the poetic arts, of which drama is one, must be those which 
entail temporal succession—rhythm, language, and tune—whereas painting 
and sculpture produce their effects through spatial extension. Spatial phe-
nomena, of course, play their part in the drama but in Aristotle's opinion this 
is a very subsidiary part . In general, Aristotle does not regard the visual arts 
highly as imitative means. Painting, for instance, is the least imitative of the 
arts: in painting there are no actions, no operations of characters; painting is 
completely static, it portrays only a single moment halted. 
The poetic work should be of sufficient magnitude to let us see all the parts 
of the completed action but not so large that we cannot keep them in mind. 
Aristotle explains that proper magnitude " i s comprised within such limits that 
the sequence of events, according to the law of probability or necessity, will 
admit of a change from bad fortune to good, or from good fortune to b a d . " 2 7 
Else believes that Aristotle's dictum that the action of the tragedy ought not to 
exceed one day refers to actual time, not dramatic time. It is the maximum 
length of time over which people can hold in their minds the concept of the 
whole, assuming an orderly arrangement of the parts; it is, in Else's words, 
" the greatest possible stretch of felt unity in an art that operates through 
t i m e . " 2 8 Analogizing the play to a living organism, Aristotle maintains that: 
a beautiful object, whether it be a living organism or any whole 
composed of parts, must not only have an orderly arrangement of 
parts, but must also be of a certain magnitude; for beauty depends on 
magnitude and order. Hence a very small animal organism cannot be 
beautiful; for the view of it is confused, the object being seen in an 
almost imperceptible moment of time. Nor, again, can one of vast size 
be beautiful; for as the eye cannot take it all in at once, the unity and 
sense of the whole is lost for the spectator. 2 9 
We notice here Aristotle's assumption that beauty is in nature but that it is 
also what a person can perceive as beautiful. Order is in nature and, at the 
same time, humans have an instinct for rhythm and harmony, for order. We 
shall see that Aristotle assumes a correspondence between humans ' faculties, 
values, and purposes and nature 's . 
In the calculation of proper length for a complete action the accidents of 
"empty t ime" are left out. And tragedy, as opposed to epic, is in length more 
efficient, more in command of its means. Aristotle admired works which were 
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dense—restricted in length and tightly packed. In fact, Else believes that the 
raison d'etre of the complex plot is this concentration and intensification. 3 0 
Again we find that the aesthetics of art are consistent with those of nature. 
Nature, in Aristotle's view, "always succeeds in attaining maximum achieve-
ment by minimum effort ." 3 1 Greater concentration and intensificaiton are 
achieved when the parts are intimately and integrally related. We understand, 
then, why it is best if the people involved in the dramatic action are near and 
dear. The requisite law of economy, together with that of causality, explains 
why recognitions are better the better they are integrated into the plot, why 
hamartia is an integral part of good tragedy, and why pity is best aroused by the 
inner sense of the piece rather than by spectacular means. 
I turn now from the whole and its surveyability as such to the relationship 
of the parts to that whole. They are naturally subordinate. "Nature has 
provided that which is less as an addition to that which is greater and superior 
and not the other way round. If, therefore this way is better, and if nature 
always does the best among possible courses, it is not through possessing 
hands that man is the most intelligent animal but it is because he is the most 
intelligent animal that he has h a n d s . " 3 2 In Aristotle's biology the form or soul 
is 'prior' to the body, and he thinks of the plot as prior to the poem in exactly 
the same way. " T h e plot is the structure of the play, around which the material 
'parts' are laid, just as the soul is the structure of m a n . " 3 3 The parts have 
interest and meaning only in so far as they serve the whole. A hand is no 
longer a hand if it is severed from the person. Moreover, nature never gives an 
organ to an animal except when it is able to make use of it; nature does 
nothing in vain. At the same time all the organs are there which are necessary 
to make a complete organism. So, in the drama, the parts gain their interest 
from their relationship to the whole. No parts comprising the whole should be 
omitted; none which do not serve the whole should be there. The relationship 
of the parts to the whole should be clear and each part as distinct as are the 
fingers on the hand of a person. "Now, as each of the parts of the body is for 
something . . . for some action, it is evident that the body as a whole must be 
constituted for some complex ac t i on . " 3 4 It is the complex action, that of a 
human being, which interests Aristotle and which he seeks to explain. As it is 
the most complex organisms which are capable of the most complex actions, it 
would seem that the organism which Aristotle has uppermost in mind in 
analogizing the best play to an organism is a human being. 
The more inclusive, complex, and various processes and organisms are 
higher. I have repeatedly spoken of values higher and lower, good and bad, 
beautiful and ugly, as being inherent in Aristotle's nature. He believes that the 
axiological antitheses of superior and inferior are to be found everywhere in 
nature—between soul and body, intellect and appetite, human and animal, 
male and female—and that where such a difference between two things exists 
it is to the advantage of both that the superior rule the inferior. As these things 
are antitheses in nature, when represented in art they should be clearly 
distinct. That art is best which represents the highest in nature: the beautiful, 
the serious, the actions of the souls of good people, males, the rule of reason. 
The organism and the play are unified wholes distinct from the rest of 
reality. They are best of surveyable size and inclusive of the highest and most 
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complex processes. The drama, like the organism, has a life; it is b o m , grows, 
and dies. Its nature, implicit until its form is fulfilled, is in suspense; we do not 
know precisely what its end will be or how it will come about, only that it has 
such an end/ which develops necessarily or probably from its beginning. The 
parts serve the whole; there are none which need not be there, all which need 
be there to serve the highest purpose of the organism or play. 
There are five sources from which critical objections to drama may be 
drawn: "Things may be censured either as impossible or irrational, or 
morally hurtful, or contradictory, or contrary to artistic correc tness ." 3 5 In 
short, that is to say, they may be censured as unnatural . 
II . K N O W I N G 
It is thinking and talking that sets human beings apart from other animals. 
The fundamental drive in humans is to set their distinctive powers of knowing 
into operation and thus to become that which they alone can become— 
knowers . 3 6 Human beings are the only organisms given to understand 
nature's logical and ethical purposes, and thus they have a central role in 
nature. To know and understand is the highest power in the world. The life of 
reason is therefore the highest life. The specific function of human beings is to 
act intelligently. And the truly human pleasures are derived from fulfilling the 
function proper—that is—specific to humans . The end which humans seek, 
happiness, is reasonable virtuous activity. As reason and moral action are 
specifically human so there is a correlation between nature 's purposes and the 
abilities of human beings. As knowing and understanding are distinctively 
human functions, one needs to concentrate on them in any study of humans 
per se. 
The things of the world simply are what they are in themselves, 
independent of out attitude toward them or our opinions about them. Yet, 
whatever is can be known. The mind is such that it can perceive the external 
world as it is. There is nothing that is unknowable. The human role in 
knowing is a very active one. Sensing is of particulars; knowledge starts with 
the perceivable, but actual knowledge is identical with the universal . 3 7 The 
forms perceived by the knower are the very forms that exist in things. The 
mind can know the world unaided by technology, such is the correspondence 
between mind and m a t t e r . 3 8 
Because of their desire to know, according to Aristotle, humans delight in 
imitation. Indeed, Aristotle would say that imitation, like the desire to know, 
is an instinct of our n a t u r e . 3 9 Imitation mirrors the world in essence, revealing 
its underlying forms and purposes. Yet that imitation is objective, and so the 
poet should speak as little as possible in his own person. The spectator, 
drawing upon the same knowledge of the world, will experience it in the same 
way. In so far as we today do not believe that the model in the mind is a mirror 
of reality but a personal and hypothetical construct of uncertain relation to a 
changing reality, we cannot think of dramatic imitation as mirroring. 
As art is, in Aristotle's belief, an imitation of reality that reveals intelligible 
structure and purpose, so art must be made by human beings; it cannot be 
found, or made by animals. Moreover art springs from the brains of superior 
people; all of us are capable of enjoying artistic imitations, but not all of us are 
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capable of producing them. Inferior intellects provide inferior art: " the graver 
spirits imitated noble actions, and the actions of good men. The more trivial 
sort imitated the actions of meaner pe r sons . " 4 0 And, as the power of knowing 
is limited in most people, Aristotle is no believer in folk creation. The belief 
that the highest art requires a superior mind and has strict demands for logic 
and unity also seems to rule against communal creation. 
Art is an activity and the Poetics is an analysis of that activity. But the end 
of that activity is the making of an external product and is distinguished from 
activity which aims at action itself. The art activity results in a finished 
product, and what the audience sees is that finished product, the true 
imitation of nature, and not the artist's efforts in arriving at it. 
III . T A L K I N G 
The world lends itself to the grasp of language; it has a logical and 
discursive character and a systematic structure. It comes in discrete parts. 
Words have fixed meanings and nature is constant. Motion, like language, 
takes place in time. Whatever is can be expressed in words and discourse. 
There is nothing that cannot be talked about, nothing wholly inaccessible to 
discourse, nothing ineffable. A thing is known when it can be stated in precise 
language what that thing is and why it is as it is. Knowledge is a matter of 
language, of verbalized distinctions, and precise statements. Discourse and 
reason are one and the same thing: " logos ." In the last analysis the structure 
of the Greek language and the structure of the world are the same. Knowing, 
one of the highest motions, depends on words . 4 1 
We can understand why drama expresses action in words and why 
Aristotle chooses poetry as the art he will discuss. Perhaps because of the 
directness with which drama presents action, Aristotle regarded the dramatic 
as superior to the narrative. While the action is necessarily conveyed in 
language, it is the plot not the language that is to move people, and certainly 
not the oral performance of that language. 4 2 
The language of drama is verse because the means of art are to be refined 
from life. The means of art, like those of nature, should be clear, efficient, and 
beautiful. The master principle of imitation decrees that good verse is a 
distillation of the natural rhythms of speech. " T h e greatest thing by far is to 
have a command of metaphor. . . . It is the mark or genius, for to make good 
metaphors implies an eye for resemblances." 4 3 Hardison explains that the 
attraction of metaphors is that while they use plain words they also make 
language distinguished. He says further that it is that ability to see hidden 
similarities that characterizes both the philosopher and the scientist in 
Aristotle's system of knowledge. 4 4 I do not think that he means to imply that 
Aristotle's science is but a system of metaphors but that the activity of scientist 
and artist is similar. It might further be pointed out that metaphors are 
compact and can serve to make the parts relate to the whole. 
I have shown much of Aristotle's Poetics to be concordant with his idea of 
nature. One idea central to the Poetics is not consistent with his view of nature 
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and that is the idea of the importance of surprise. Pity and fear are most 
effectively aroused—or, rather, since Aristotle talks about events, structural 
elements in the play, fearful and pathetic happenings are most effectively 
brought about—when they come about logically but unexpectedly. Gerald 
Else believes that the unexpected "appears to be a concept which Aristotle 
originally associated with the epic, in the primary sense of wonders and 
marvels (Cyclops, Circe, the magic ship of the Phaeacians, etc.), and only 
later worked into his view of tragedy. In the epic it is characterized as having a 
kind of low "appea l " and it is practically identified with the irrational or the 
absurd. The irrational, Aristotle says, "should be banished from tragedy as 
far as poss ib le ." 4 5 Else therefore endeavors to explain the importance of 
surprise in tragedy for Aristotle: 
The essence of the tragic is an irreconcilable conflict between man 's 
nature and his fate. Aristotle does not speak of such a conflict; his 
Socratic-Platonic inheritance was too strong for that. Nevertheless, in 
so far as he senses its existence, it plays its role in his theory in the guise 
of the "fearful and pitiful." This means in the first place a drastic 
reduction in its dimensions; for fear and pity are measured by " u s " 
Vhomme moyen sensuel. But then Aristotle further postulates that they are 
most felt when the events that " c a r r y " them seem to be irrational (i.e. 
contrary to what we expected) but are not so (i.e., standing in causal 
relation to one another after all). This is his attempt to make the best of 
two incompatible worlds. The Tragic, the inrush of the demonic 
powers upon a man ' s happiness, becomes merely the "unexpected" 
the unforeseen, and in this guise the Tragic is wedded to Causality 
( = probability or necessi ty) . 4 6 
Else's view seems to be that the idea of surprise arises from Aristotle's 
unconcious understanding of nature. I stop short of such argument. 
Because the aesthetic principles to be employed in the drama are the 
natural ones, they form the structure of the Poetics as well. Aristotle, as he says, 
arranges the Poetics by following the order of n a t u r e . 4 7 He begins with the 
whole art and then moves to tragedy, and then focuses on progressively 
smaller parts of that whole, poetry and then tragedy, and then each part of 
tragedy in order of importance, plot first. It looks, apart from what are 
generally thought to be interpolations, as though Aristotle might have had 
some intention in the Poetics of making each section proportionate in length to 
its importance in tragedy. 
No Aristotelian scholar takes the text of the Poetics remaining to us as the 
completed product, although none seems to doubt that, in either written or 
verbal form, there once was a completed product. And what remains to us, as 
Gerald Else has convincingly argued is " a single coherent piece of argu-
m e n t . " 4 8 It is chiefly on the basis of the structure of this argument that 
scholars have argued that some portions of the text are later interpolations by 
Aristotle or another. It is also on the basis of the structure of this argument 
that latter day extrapolations on the nature of comedy have been made. The 
argument constituting the structure of the essay is the equivalent of the action 
of the drama. It is written so that we attend to the structure of the argument 
and the meaning of the words. The argument is single; there is a linear 
progression; each part is clearly delineated and follows from the preceding 
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part necessarily or probably. It is presented primarily in terms of universals. It 
is meant to be timeless. As there are higher and lower forms of poetry, and 
tragedy is the highest, we can understand that Aristotle took up tragedy first— 
if, in fact, he ever did get around to writing about comedy at all. Early in the 
argument (chapter 4) Aristotle provides a history of poetry and of drama in 
particular, it being important in understanding anything to know its cause. 
Else is convincing in arguing that this "his tory" is a logical construct rather 
than a genuine history, despite the weight given it by various later theatre 
historians. 4 9 Aristotle writes it with assurance because it is, in his belief, the 
reasonable development and therefore, probably, the true one. The tone of the 
whole is authoritative and serious; Aristotle is confident in his powers of 
knowing and his role in nature to define, explain, and show significance. 
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